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FOR LOVE OR MONEY:
SOME EMOTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF RATIONALITY
GERALD L. CLORE
A long tradition, stretching from classical philosophy to the present,
views passion as the enemy of reason. Certainly emotion can lead to rash
action, but admonitions to rise above our animal passions and substitute
logic for emotion turn out to be bad advice. Results from psychology' and
affective neuroscience 2 suggest that, in the final analysis, emotional con-
siderations may be essential for attaining reasonable (adaptive and desir-
able) outcomes. We have even seen in recent years a surge of public and
scholarly interest in the concept of "emotional intelligence," 3 a concept that
classical philosophers would surely have found puzzling. In this Article, I
review aspects of emotion theory to suggest a basis for believing that emo-
tion may indeed be a necessity for reason.
Rational choice theory in economics and sociology has often been
criticized for its insistence on evaluating behavior solely in terms of its
utility and profit-maximizing potential. Many scholars have attempted to
broaden the theory by suggesting that the notion of rationality might in-
clude noninstrumental as well as strictly instrumental and utilitarian behav-
ior.4 It should be possible, they suggest, for behavior to be irrational
economically but quite rational on noneconomic grounds. The problem
with many of these attempts is that, while they are surely correct at some
level, they frequently fail to be persuasive because of the ad hoc nature of
the supplemental categories proposed. Emotion theory, on the other hand,
provides a principled basis for expanding the narrow utilitarianism of ra-
tional choice theory.
1. Timothy Ketelaar & Gerald L. Clore, Emotion and Reason: The Proximate Effects and Ulti-
mate Functions of Emotions, in COGNITIVE SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES ON PERSONALITY AND EMOTION
355, 387 (Gerald Matthews ed., 1997).
2. ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES' ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE HUMAN BRAIN 61
(1994).
3. Peter Salovey & John D. Mayer, Emotional Intelligence, 9 IMAGINATION, COGNITION &
PERSONALITY 185, 189-91 (1990).
4. See, e.g., Raymond Boudon, Limitations of Rational Choice Theory, 104 AM J. SOC. 817, 818
(1998); Milan Zafirovski, Human Rational Behavior and Economic Rationality, 7 ELECTRONIC J. SOC.
(2003), at http://www.sociology.org/content/vo7.2/02 zafirovski.html.
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In this Article, I focus on the problem of rationality of ends and sug-
gest that emotion theory provides a way out of the conceptual dead end to
which economic models often seem to lead. The basic point is simply that
emotion is an embodiment of value. The importance of this assertion in the
present context lies in the realization that "value" is critical to rationality.
Knowing whether one is acting rationally (in terms of reaching a desirable
outcome) requires a criterion of value against which to judge whether an
outcome is good. Emotion provides a powerful criterion. A positive emo-
tion, such as joy, provides compelling experiential evidence of the desir-
ability of an outcome, and a negative emotion such as disappointment
signals that an outcome is undesirable relative to what was wanted or ex-
pected. Underlying such feelings are implicit cognitive, neurochemical, and
physiological reactions, which also reflect the value of outcomes and sup-
port the experiential representation of value.
Emotion not only serves an informational role, signaling the value of
things, but it is also an embodiment of such value. Rather than simply be-
lieving something to be of value, emotion creates a direct experience of that
value. Emotion turns mere belief that something is good or bad into an
experience of goodness or badness. Emotions are thus powerful states that
are fueled by desires and aversions, making us hope for some outcomes and
fear others. In this way, emotion not only adjudicates which outcomes are
good and which are bad, but it encourages, through the carrot of pleasure
and the stick of displeasure, actions consistent with such judgments.
I am arguing that emotions tell us whether we have chosen rationally.
Of course, if a criterion of value is important for assessing the desirability
of past outcomes, it is also important for assessing the desirability of poten-
tial or anticipated outcomes, and hence for making rational choices in the
first place. The logic of this conclusion about the role of affect in judgment
and decision making is buttressed by evidence from the study of break-
downs of decision making among individuals whose ability to read their
own affective reactions has been compromised by damage to the prefrontal
cortex.5 In addition, the results of behavioral studies of affect and judgment
lead to similar conclusions. 6
5. E.g., DAMASIO, supra note 2, at 61.
6. E.g., Gerald L. Clore & Karen Gasper, Feeling Is Believing: Some Affective Influences on
Belief in EMOTIONS AND BELIEFS: How FEELINGS INFLUENCE THOUGHTS 10, 38-39 (Nico H. Frijda et
al. eds., 2000).
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I. THE BASIS OF VALUE
The assumption that people always act in a purely self-interested fash-
ion in choosing ends is surely false. For example, as Rubin points out,
many people who had no obvious self-interest at stake involved themselves
in citizen movements for civil rights, disability rights, and women's rights.
7
These and other altruistic actions would not fit neatly into an economic
model, which assumes that choices must be manifestations of self-interest.
Economic models are quite useful for certain purposes. Their great
virtue is that they allow quantitative modeling of choice behavior. Because
accurate prediction of human behavior is made difficult by the enormous
number of unknowns, quantitative modeling always requires some simpli-
fying assumptions. Thus, even if it is not literally true that people always
act in self-interested ways, it may still be strategically sound to assume that
they do so for modeling purposes. Economists, partly for such practical,
computational reasons, generally interpret self-interest in terms of mone-
tary gains and losses, a move which is quantitatively useful but greatly
limits the range of applicability of such analyses. A point made in the final
section of this Article is that people are motivated not by money, but by the
value it represents, and that it is important to distinguish underlying value
from monetary or emotional representations of that value. Now, however,
let us consider what it means to say that emotions are representations of
value.
II. EMOTIONS AS EMBODIMENTS OF VALUE
If cognition is about truth and falsity and is concerned with categoriza-
tion, then emotion is about goodness and badness and is concerned with
evaluation. Emotions are embodied evaluations, and much of their variety
comes from the particulars of what is being evaluated. Emotion can be
thought of as similar to pain, in that it involves both information and moti-
vation. For example, the feeling of negative emotion, like the feeling of
pain, provides us with distinctive information that something in particular
is wrong. Emotions and instances of pain also vary in terms of intensity,
which, in both cases, provides a rough guide to the seriousness of the prob-
lem. The information from pain is about tissue damage, whereas the infor-
mation from emotion is about value-that is, about the goodness and
badness of things.
7. Edward L. Rubin, Rational Choice and Rat Choice: Some Thoughts on the Relationship
Among Rationality, Markets, and Human Beings, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1091 (2005).
2005]
CHICAGO-KENT LA WREVIEW
Pain is a somewhat simpler system than emotion in that we have spe-
cialized receptors in the skin that are partly responsible for pain. In con-
trast, we do not have specialized detectors of value. Instead, we arrive at
the emotional significance of events, actions, and objects through some sort
of cognitive appraisal process. Such cognitive appraisals may be made
lightning fast or may be extended in time, but however they are made, such
evaluations are core features of the resulting emotions.
A variety of theoretical accounts of the relationship between such ap-
praisals and the structure of emotions have been proposed. One of these,
known in the cognitive science literature as "the OCC Account," 8 is espe-
cially useful for the present purposes because it lays out the ways in which
the various types of emotions reflect underlying kinds of value.
III. KINDS OF VALUE
According to the OCC Account, emotional reactions reflect three dis-
tinct kinds of good, one for each of the possible kinds of things upon which
attention can be focused. 9 As depicted in Table 1 below, these points of
focus include the outcomes of events, the actions of agents, and the attrib-
utes of objects. 10 These three kinds of focus are intended to be comprehen-
sive. For example, "objects" can include not only physical objects, but
places, people, ideas, activities, and so on. Thus, one can appraise out-
comes as desirable or undesirable, depending on whether they further or
thwart one's goals." 1 One can appraise actions as praiseworthy or blame-
worthy, depending on whether they meet or fall short of applicable stan-
dards.' 2 Or, one may appraise objects as being appealing or unappealing, a
judgment that depends on one's tastes and attitudes. 13
Just as there are three kinds of focus and three bases for appraisals, the
theory also envisions three kinds of affective reactions-being pleased or
displeased about outcomes, approving or disapproving of actions, and lik-
ing or disliking objects. 14 Specific emotions, then, are differentiated forms
of these affective reactions. 15 Being happy, sad, or fearful about outcomes
8. See generally ANDREW ORTONY, GERALD L. CLORE & ALLAN COLLINS, THE COGNITIVE
STRUCTURE OF EMOTIONS (1988) [hereinafter OCC ACCOUNT].
9. Id. at 18-19.
10. Id. at 18.
11. ld. at 53.
12. ld.
13. Id. at 56.
14. Id. at 33.
15. Id.
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are forms of being pleased or displeased. 16 Being proud or ashamed of
actions are forms of approval or disapproval.17 Finally, loving, hating, or
being disgusted at objects and their attributes are reactions that can be
thought of as forms of liking and disliking.
18
TABLE 1 Appraisals of events, actions, and objects are based on different sources of value and are
manifested as different kinds of affective reactions, which are differentiated into specific emotions.
FOCUS OF Outcomes of Events Actions of Agents Attributes of Objects
ATTENTION
SOURCE OF VALUE Goals Standards Tastes/Attitudes
APPRAISAL Desirable or Undesir- Praiseworthy or Blame- Like or Dislike
able worthy
AFFECTIVE Feel Pleased or Feel Approval or Disap- Feel Liking or Dislik-
REACTION Displeased proval ing
EMOTION Joy, Sadness, Fear, Pride, Shame, etc. Love, Hate, Disgust,
etc. etc.
Source: ANDREW ORTONY, GERALD L. CLORE & ALLAN COLLINS, THE COGNITIVE STRUCTURE OF
EMOTIONS (1988).
The OCC Account of the cognitive structure of emotions has a number
of implications for understanding the variety and intensity of emotion
types. 19 The approach was designed with the requirements of computer
modeling in mind. The idea was not to make computers feel emotion, of
course, because feelings require the appropriate physiology. Instead, the
goal was to write the rules governing emotion elicitation and emotion in-
tensity and to do so in a sufficiently systematic way that a computer pro-
gram could employ them as a knowledge base for making appropriate
inferences about people's emotions in particular situations. The chief im-
pact of the theory has been in the fields of computer science and artificial
intelligence, where the OCC rules have become useful components of what
are called "believable agents." Believable agents include virtual teachers in
tutorial or computer training programs and characters in interactive com-
puter games. It turns out that such interactive computer agents are more
effective tutors and more likeable and engaging characters when their re-
sponses are guided by knowledge about the emotional reactions most likely
16, Id. at 107.
17. Id- at 19, 154-
18. Id. at 19, 171.
19. Id. at 181.
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to arise in particular situations and knowledge about how intense such reac-
tions are likely to be.
20
The OCC account of emotion organizes twenty-two different emotion
types into six emotion families. 2' Although the emotions in the theory are
designated by English words, the theory is not about emotion language, but
about the emotions themselves. Thus, for each of the twenty-two emotion
types, a given language might contain many lexical tokens. Each emotion
type is characterized by its cognitive or situational eliciting conditions, by
the cognitive factors that influence its intensity, and by examples of situa-
tions in which it might be felt. The specifications for emotions in the fear
type are shown in Table 2, as an example.
The OCC model describes the cognitive structure of emotions. That is,
it maps the emotions in terms of the kinds of psychological situations in
which one rather than another emotion is likely to be elicited. It includes
analyses of particular emotions, such as the relatively complex emotion of
anger, which is viewed as arising from a joint focus on undesirable out-
comes and blameworthy actions. The intensity of anger also depends both
on how undesirable the outcome (e.g., one might be more angry at oneself
for losing $1000 than for losing $10) and on how blameworthy the action
(e.g., one might be more angry at someone completely at fault than some-
one only partially at fault).




Associated Lexical Apprehensive, anxious, dread, fear, fright, nervous, petrified, scared, terrified,
Items timid, uncomfortable, worried, etc.
Eliciting Condition Prospective undesirable event
Intensity increases 1. Degree to which event is undesirable
with 2. Likelihood of the event
Example A person at home alone hears an intruder enter the house
20. For examples, see Clark Elliot, Summary of Affective Reasoner Information (1997), at
http://www.depaul-edu/-elliott/ar/ and Press Release, Zoesis Studios, Zoesis Studios Unveils New
Interactive Attractions at TheLivingLetters.com, the Intemet's Only Expanding Theme Park for Chil-
dren (Nov. 14, 2000), at http://ottoandiris.com/corporate/release3.html.
21. OCC ACCOUNT, supra note 8, at 19, 192.
(Vol 80:1151
FOR LOVE OR MONEY
For our present purpose, the most important aspect of the OCC ac-
count of emotion concerns the three different sources of value, which are
ultimately the bases for our caring about outcomes, actions, and objects.
Events are occasions of joy or distress, for example, only to the extent that
some outcome is experienced as potentially relevant to one's goals and
concerns. Some events, such as finding a snake in one's house, are likely to
be distressing to most people, whereas other events, such as finding a
grasshopper in one's house, may be distressing to very few people. Simi-
larly, some actions, such as getting drunk, might be an occasion for shame
or embarrassment for some people, whereas for some college students, it
might occasion pride. The difference, according to the OCC account, would
depend on whether one viewed that behavior as falling short of, or as ex-
ceeding, some important standard of behavior. Similarly, an object such as
a political candidate or an item of food might elicit liking in some people
and disliking in others, depending on the compatibility of the candidate or
the food with relevant attitudes or tastes. Additionally, a single event could
elicit emotions in all of these categories in rapid succession as one's atten-
tion shifted from one aspect of the event to another. Thus, learning that
one's neighbor physically abused his wife might make one alternately feel
sympathy for the wife, anger at the husband's action, and dislike for the
husband himself, each in turn as one's focus shifts from the undesirability
of the outcome for her, to the blameworthiness of his action, and to the
unappealingness of such a person. Emotion, then, depends on the percep-
tion of something as good or bad in some way with the particular kind of
emotion depending ultimately on the particular kind of goodness and bad-
ness involved. The kind of value is, in turn, dependent on momentary shifts
in attention. This glimpse of the attentional, cognitive, and value compo-
nents of the emotional elicitation process is intended to suggest that there is
some logic to emotion, a fact that is too often obscured in discussions of
emotion in the judgment and decision-making literature. Now, we are pre-
pared to ask about emotion and rationality.
IV. EMOTION AND RATIONALITY
Within the rational choice model, the assumption that people's actions
are ultimately guided by self-interest still requires knowing what people
will see as in their self-interest. 22 Emotion theory is potentially useful in
22. Of course, the rationality of ends idea often also includes the belief that people should act in
strictly self-interested ways so as not to disrupt the efficient workings of markets. However, once such a
prescriptive element is introduced, science and dogma become conflated, making the assertion an article
of faith rather than a hypothesis about behavior.
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this task because it offers a basis for expanding what it might mean to say
that people act in a self-interested way. The idea that self-interest should be
definable solely in economic terms limits the applicability of the hypothesis
to situations in which a translation into monetary terms is possible. At-
tempts to translate nonmonetary value into monetary value do occur in
many domains. Judgments involving punitive damages are a prime exam-
ple. Judges and juries are frequently asked to decide how much money
would compensate a person whose loss has resulted from the blameworthy
action of another. In some well-known cases, such as the continuing saga
of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, armies of consultants have been called upon
to suggest how such damages might be fairly assessed. One proposal in-
volves surveying people about how much money a clean environment is
worth to them. Making such judgments turns out to be quite difficult, and
emotion theory helps explain why that should be the case. In addition, it
clarifies why in some cultures, any attempt to recompense a person who
had been wronged by offering them money would only compound the of-
fense. Of course, all of us find attempts to put a price on some things to be
inappropriate. For example, attempting to exchange money for love is gen-
erally looked down upon,23 probably even by those who attempt to do so.
According to the OCC approach to emotions, there are multiple kinds
of goodness and badness. Moreover, these multiple kinds are assumed to be
incommensurate, which means that there are in principle no equations
which would allow one to solve for the price of beauty or the cost of dis-
loyalty. People have long considered it a devil's errand to try to "econo-
mize" moral or immoral action. Indeed, the legend of Faust concerns a
hapless individual who tried to use his morality as barter for wealth, lei-
sure, and status. In none of the many versions of the tale does Faust's pact
with the Devil have a happy ending, suggesting (to those with ears to hear
it) that there is no efficient market for the soul. The longevity of the Faust
legend attests to the idea that people long ago realized that there are natu-
rally different kinds of value, which cannot be shoehorned into a single
kind of value.
The suggestion that we need to recognize additional kinds of value
beyond utilitarian or economic value is an idea that rational choice theorists
are likely to reject. They would surely argue that opening up the basis of
valuation to multiple kinds of value would make the task of accounting for
behavior unmanageable. However, emotion theory is not an open-ended
system implying countless sources of value. It assumes only three: goals,
23. URIEL G. FOA & EDNA B. FOA, SOCIETAL STRUCTURES OF THE MIND 218 (1974).
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standards, and tastes. Moreover, one can argue that its claims are not in the
least arbitrary. On the contrary, emotions are bodily representations of
value that have evolved in our species over eons. It is not clear that there
could be any more solid basis for establishing value than that. Three kinds
evolved, we argue, and serve as engines for the variety of universally
shared emotions we observe.
If we allow emotion theory to augment analyses based on economic
costs and benefits with additional sources of valuation, then otherwise irra-
tional behavior becomes reasonable. For example, there would be nothing
irrational about spending more to sue one's neighbor than one stood to
gain, if the cash settlement were supplemented by some other kind of good,
such as seeing justice done. Of course, rational choice proponents might
still rightly complain that whereas utilitarian good has a useful metric, none
exists for moral or aesthetic good, making behavior evaluated in these
terms much more difficult to model quantitatively.
V. EMOTIONAL ACCOUNTING
One problematic consequence of the fact that we have evolved to re-
spond to multiple kinds of value is the problem of emotional accounting. I
have argued that emotions are registrations of the appraised value of out-
comes, actions, and objects. There are two ways in which such emotional
reactions can be powerful. One way is by being directed at a specific ob-
ject. Emotions typically have objects, so that one is not simply angry, but
rather one is angry at some particular person about some particular action.
Having a specific object makes an emotion powerful because resources can
then be directed to cope with that problem or to seize that opportunity.
A second way in which emotional reactions can be powerful is, para-
doxically, by not having an object. Moods are examples of affective states
that are similar to emotions, but for which the object, if any, is not salient.
As a result, one may experience an affective reaction without any clear
cause or meaning. Depression has this character, as do states of general
anxiety. In such states, one may feel down or apprehensive, but without
knowing why. The power of such states is a bit like the power of a flood-
indiscriminate, affecting whatever happens to be in its path. Why is object-
less affect so promiscuous?
Emotions reflect the results of appraisal processes that are largely
automatic and unconscious. The feelings of emotion provide conscious
information about the results of such unconscious appraisals. Emotions
evolved in part to signal that some specific stimulus has positive or nega-
tive value. At least when such mental content is conscious, one usually
20051
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knows the object of one's emotion. However, when the real object is not
salient at the time, then the feelings tend to take as their object whatever
comes to mind, an observation made by many writers from Freud to the
present. Again, for this reason, a problem with depression is that it tends to
taint whatever one thinks about. In a similar way, anxiety can be exhaust-
ing in part because, without a clear object, there is no way to isolate a spe-
cific threat so that one can deal with it. One can view these kinds of
problems as problems in keeping straight what our affective reactions are
about, which are problems of affective accounting.
As the CEO of one's own self, it is important to keep accurate books,
to know where resources are going and where they are needed. Insistent
indications that problems exist but cannot be located may make it seem like
everything is falling apart. One of the functions of psychotherapy is to as-
sist individuals experiencing such mental accounting problems. Clients
often come to therapists depressed or anxious, with vague complaints, or
feeling that everything is going wrong. The therapist's role is often to en-
courage the client to talk about the problem in order to help him or her
arrive at a useful mental accounting. When a cause is located, the client's
diffuse mood state can turn into a specific emotion, because it is then ex-
perienced as being about something in particular. During such emotional
bookkeeping, people often begin to see that many things that are important
to them are not in the problematic account. The person may experience
great relief as the locus of the problem narrows. Of course, identifying the
cause may bring new problems to the fore, but at least they are likely to be
more specific and identifiable.
VI. ACCOUNTING FOR MULTIPLE GOODS
Issues of accounting-keeping track of what is causing what-also
surface in other ways. The source of an experience may be quite clear as
long as it is experienced by itself, but the experience may become less ac-
countable when a separate cause produces a very similar experience at the
same time. This process is clearly evident in the domain of visual experi-
ence. In vision, different but highly redundant images are presented by the
two eyes. Our eyes move together so that the images that are projected are
almost, but not quite, the same. Indeed, they are so similar that it is impos-
sible to keep straight which image is coming from which eye. When visual
accounting fails because it is impossible to keep books on which eye is
contributing which image, we see an emergent three-dimensional image
rather than separate, flat images from each eye. We see objects in holo-
gram-like reality as both eyes provide parallel, but slightly different images
[Vol 80:1151
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of the same thing. Presumably, such emergence reflects the fact that it is
computationally simpler to see one object as "out there" rather than keep-
ing track of two highly redundant sensory streams.
A related principle appears to operate when we apprehend more than
one kind of goodness or badness simultaneously emanating from a single
object. Consider a political leader whose policies are good in a utilitarian
sense, who also engages in admirable actions, and who is additionally
handsome and well-spoken. Such a figure may command a degree of loy-
alty that none of these attributes by themselves would have elicited, in part
because of the difficulty of keeping straight what aspects of our experience
of goodness comes from what source. As a result, the leader may be ex-
perienced as transcendentally good. Through a similar process, people fall
in love not only because their beloved helps in the satisfaction of their
goals (utilitarian good), but also because they may be seen as excellent or
admirable in some way and because they may seem beautiful or handsome.
The emergent experience of their goodness becomes, in fact, beyond ac-
counting. Falling in love thus renders some people inarticulate, while it
inspires others to poetry. Both reactions may flow from the same impossi-
bility of sorting out which aspects of one's fascination with the other are
accounted for by which aspects of their goodness.
There are many such emergent experiences that may arise for similar
reasons. Thus, the experience of nostalgia may be one in which one experi-
ences oneself in the present remembering something in the past, feeling at
once the immediacy of a sweet memory of an event at the same time that
one is experiencing the sadness of its distance in time. Similarly, an inti-
mate conversation or romantic encounter may seem important not only
because it may be intense, but perhaps also because one constructs from the
visual, verbal, and nonverbal feedback from the other a model of their ex-
perience at the same time that one entertains one's own view. To the extent
that partial redundancy blurs clear accounting, a joint experience may
emerge. The process is also seen in an operatic duet or a string quartet, in
which rather than hearing only music from separate players, a new entity
emerges in one's experience that transcends their individual contributions.
In the interpersonal situation, such convergence may be experienced as a
vital entity that is somehow more than each person's input. Couples often
point to such experiences as the moment in which they fell in love.
Are such experiences illusions? Perhaps no more than three-
dimensional images are illusions. I am suggesting that failures of emotional
accounting, just like those of visual accounting, allow one to experience
multiple facets of the same person, place, or event at the same time. In the
20051
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emotional case, the different sources of good are incommensurate, meaning
that they cannot be translated or equated. They must remain separate, but
because they emanate from the same entity and are apprehended at the
same time, no such accounting is possible so that a multifaceted new entity
emerges in experience that is all of these incommensurate but redundant
things at once. One can then experience them as one emergent reality, such
that the whole can be appreciated as more than its parts, which, of course, it
is.
In summary, I have suggested that, somewhat surprisingly, the asser-
tions of emotion theory might make it more rather than less sensible to say
that people's choices are guided by rational ends. People's choices are
probably not narrowly self-regarding in the sense that they seek only posi-
tive outcomes for themselves. However, their choices may still be guided
by what they care about. Emotion theory makes clear that the category of
things people care about is more diverse than economic ends or than any
strictly utilitarian ends. By distinguishing three different and incommensu-
rate sources of value that fuel the emotions, we see that even choices that
reduce one's financial outcome can be rational if they achieve some other
kind of good. I argued that each of these kinds of good have an equal call to
legitimacy because specific emotions evolved to provide embodied infor-
mation about that particular good and to engender sufficiently urgent moti-
vation to drive actions and choices. In this view, emotion becomes the seat
of rationality, rather than its undoing.
Thus far, we have discussed emotion theory as an alternative to eco-
nomic models. However, I suggested in the sections on affective account-
ing that there is a sense in which the problem of accounting is important in
both worlds. In the final section, I suggest still further that economic and
emotional phenomena may not be at odds after all. To the extent that both
emotion and money are representations of value, we find that they inhabit
parallel worlds.
VII. THE AFFECTIVE ECONOMY
"Affect" refers to embodied evaluative reactions. Affect, like money,
is a token of value. In spending our money, whether following our emo-
tions is rational or irrational in terms of results depends on the relationships
between these tokens of value and the underlying value. If we buy some-
thing for more than it is worth, we have behaved irrationally. If we get
angrier than is warranted by another's blameworthiness, fall in love with an
unworthy person, or pledge loyalty to a demagogue, we are irrational, not
[Vol 80:11511162
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because we have followed our emotions, but because we have acted on
value that was not there.
Does this "affect-as-token-of-value" approach have other implica-
tions?
Are there useful parallels between the behavior of affect and money?
Yes, it appears that there are. Depression, for example, occurs not only in
the monetary economy, but also in the affective economy. It is a process
whereby there is a shortage of value tokens-whether it is a depressed
monetary economy or a depressed affective economy. One has nothing to
invest, and the problem is then that one has no expectation of return either.
In depressions, money and affect are scarce.
There is perhaps also an analogy with respect to inflation. In monetary
inflation, the amount that a dollar will buy decreases. A specific unit of
currency comes to have less value. Something analogous also occurs in
affective inflation. Promiscuity, gambling, drug taking, and other risky
activities can be thrilling and can elicit unusually large amounts of dopa-
mine, which supports powerful affective experiences. For example, taking
particular drugs can produce the kind of experience that would signify that
something wonderful has happened, when in fact nothing of significance
has occurred at all. Alcohol and certain other drugs can make one feel that
one's powers have been magnified and that one is charming and desirable.
The problem is that the feelings produced in this way often turn out to be
inflated because their apparent value is not backed by hard reality. In
monetary economies, when large amounts of money are suddenly intro-
duced without increases in production, the relationship between tokens of
value and underlying value becomes similarly distorted. In the affective
economy, when more affective currency (e.g., dopamine) is produced than
is warranted by the underlying value of its causes (desirable events,
praiseworthy actions, appealing objects), the same thing happens. The re-
sult is that the feelings (or a given charge of dopamine) lose value. Every-
day activities lose value because they cannot produce enough of a high, so
one loses motivation.
Hedonism is a powerful explanatory assumption. Pleasure and pain
look like the universal currency of behaving systems. But just as econo-
mists should not conclude that our prime motivation is to make money,
psychologists also should not assume that our prime motivation is to make
pleasure. Money, like positive affect, is a representation of value. A fallacy
of materialism and hedonism is the assumption that the function of behav-




In the monetary economy, hoarding is the attempt to accumulate to-
kens of value rather than spending or investing those tokens on something
with underlying value. It appears that the economy is more healthy when
money is used as a medium of exchange, rather than as a commodity in
itself. If so, then there would appear to be an analogous affective process.
The paradox of affect is that we are motivated by positive affect, and
yet pursuing positive affect for its own sake is seldom successful. The basic
cause of this curious fact presumably concerns the value-conferring aspect
of affect. Ordinarily, affect serves as information.2 4 That is, the experience
of affect provides information about value. A positive response means that
something of value has been encountered. When the focus is on things
other than itself, such responses confer value on those things. But if one is
focused on pleasure itself, then value is simply conferred on pleasure. In
this onanistic process, no value or meaning is transferred to anything else.
From the examples of Greek and Roman societies to our present society,
we are told that prosperity is paradoxically unhealthy for societies. 25 Once
people succeed in driving the wolf from their door and become affluent,
things often seem to unravel as individuals cease investing their labor and
concern in things that pay dividends and invest instead only in the pleasure
itself. In any case, the paradox is that money and positive affect are both
good only so long as they serve as means and not as ends.
In the monetary economy, scarcity of money leads to hoarding, which
exacerbates the scarcity. Without any investment of money, nothing of
value is produced to be exchanged, further reducing available money. Does
scarcity of affect create affective hoarding? One suspects that it might.
People who are emotionally down seem less likely to invest the emotional
resources they have, which further reduces the possibility of a rewarding
response. Withdrawing from emotional investment seems likely to further
reduce emotional rewards.
In summary, I have argued that there is perhaps a useful analogy be-
tween affect and money in that both are tokens of value. The question
raised in this final section is whether there are parallels between human
behavior with respect to these tokens of value. In addition to the parallels
concerning accounting discussed in previous sections, I have suggested
three parallels, including depression, inflation, and hoarding. The implica-
tion is that our ultimate motivation is neither for money nor pleasure, but
24. Norbert Schwarz & Gerald L. Clore, Mood, Misattribution, and Judgments of Well-Being:
Informative and Directive Functions of Affective States, 45 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 513, 520
(1983).
25. See generally DAVID C. MCCLELLAND, THE ACHIEVING SOCIETY (1961).
[Vol 80:1151
2005] FOR LOVE OR MONEY 1165
for the underlying good which they signify. Many psychologists are cur-
rently focused on the problem of emotion regulation. But maximizing
pleasure and minimizing pain in the short run is less important than invest-
ing one's efforts (and hence one's affect) in endeavors and relationships
that pay affective dividends. The important kind of affect regulation per-
haps is that which is focused on conserving the valuing capacity of the
appraisal system in order to keep the currency of affect sound.

